

AN ANALYSIS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW ON THE SETTLEMENT OF TRADE DISPUTES WITHIN THE WTO FRAMEWORK

Gunawan Widjaja

Senior Lecturer, Faculty of Law Universitas 17 Agustus 1945 Jakarta,
widjaja_gunawan@yahoo.com

Abstract

International trade is a cornerstone of the modern global economy; however, differences in trade policy and protectionism often trigger disputes between countries that have the potential to disrupt the smooth flow of international trade. The World Trade Organisation (WTO), established in 1995, plays a central role in creating a rules-based multilateral trade governance system through the dispute settlement mechanism set out in the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU). This study aims to analyse the trade dispute settlement mechanism within the WTO framework and to identify implementation challenges and the need for reform from the perspective of international economic law. The research method employs a qualitative literature review using a juridical-normative approach. The findings indicate that the WTO's dispute settlement mechanism provides legal certainty through a compulsory quasi-judicial system comprising a 60-day consultation phase, the formation of a panel within 6–9 months, an appeal to the Appellate Body within 90 days, and the implementation of the ruling. However, this system faces a serious existential crisis regarding the paralysis of the Appellate Body since December 2019 due to the United States' refusal to appoint new members, which creates legal uncertainty and undermines the winning party's right to enforce its rights. The imbalance of power between developed and developing countries, the difficulties in enforcing rulings against countries with dominant economic power, and the limited retaliatory capacity of developing countries reveal the structural weaknesses of the compliance mechanism. Reform of the WTO dispute settlement system is a priority, covering the review of appeals, the speed of proceedings, compliance rights, and capacity building. The Multilateral Provisional Appeal Arbitration (MPIA) arrangement promoted by the European Union provides an alternative dispute settlement mechanism to overcome deadlocks in the Appellate Body. This study emphasises the importance of institutional reform to ensure that the WTO remains a cornerstone of the global trading system.

Keywords: International economic law, WTO, trade dispute settlement, Dispute Settlement Understanding, Appellate Body, DSU reform

Introduction

International trade has become a cornerstone of the modern global economy, linking countries from across the globe in a complex network of economic transactions. In this context, a fair and predictable trade regime is vital for maintaining global economic stability (Busch & Reinhardt, 2000). However, reality shows that differences in trade policy, protectionism and imbalances in economic interests often trigger

disputes between countries that have the potential to disrupt the smooth flow of international trade.

The World Trade Organisation (WTO), established in 1995, plays a central role in creating a rules-based multilateral trade governance framework. The WTO replaced the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), which had previously regulated international trade in a manner that was more political than legalistic (Putri, 2026). This fundamental change introduced a more rule-oriented and quasi-judicial dispute settlement system, which is regarded as a significant improvement over its predecessor.

The dispute settlement mechanism within the WTO is set out in the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU), which serves as the primary legal instrument for resolving trade disputes between WTO members (Wolfe, 2020). The DSU contains comprehensive rules and procedures covering various types of disputes, ranging from breaches of agreements on trade in goods and services to trade-related aspects of intellectual property rights. The uniqueness of this system lies in its compulsory nature, whereby WTO members must use the DSU procedures to resolve disputes and may not take unilateral action.

The Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) is a specialised body responsible for resolving trade disputes within the WTO framework. The DSB has jurisdiction over all disputes between WTO members arising from agreements falling within the scope of the WTO, including GATT 1994, GATS and TRIPS (Rubiyanto, 2019a). This institutional structure demonstrates the WTO's commitment to ensuring legal certainty in global trade through organised and structured mechanisms.

The WTO dispute settlement process is quasi-judicial in nature and consists of four main stages: consultations, examination by a panel, review by the Appellate Body, and implementation of the ruling (Ortino & Petersmann, 2004). The consultation stage aims to resolve the dispute diplomatically before entering into formal litigation. If consultations fail, the parties will proceed to the panel stage, where an ad hoc panel will examine the factual and legal aspects of the dispute.

The Appellate Body serves as a permanent appellate body comprising seven judges, each serving a four-year term, to review the legal aspects of panel reports (McDougall, 2018). The primary role of the Appellate Body is to ensure legal consistency and certainty in the interpretation of WTO agreements, so that the resulting decisions provide predictability for WTO members in formulating their trade policies. The existence of this Appellate Body is a significant innovation that distinguishes the WTO system from traditional international dispute settlement systems.

The WTO dispute settlement system is often referred to as the 'crown jewel' of the world trade system as it is the only comprehensive and compulsory third-party adjudication regime in international relations (Cling, 2014). Since its establishment in 1995, this mechanism has resolved an impressive number of disputes and gained a reputation as the most widely used system for settling disputes between states in the

world(Rubiyanto, 2019a) . Over more than two decades of operation, this system has become the most widely used State-to-State international dispute settlement system. However, the system, which was previously considered flawless, is now facing a serious existential crisis, particularly in relation to the paralysis of the Appellate Body since December 2019. The United States has repeatedly refused to appoint new members to the Appellate Body, meaning that the quorum required to hear appeals has not been reached. Since 11 December 2019, the Appellate Body has had only one member out of its normal complement of seven, rendering it unable to hear new appeals effectively (Wagner, 2020).

The Appellate Body crisis has triggered a series of operational, legal and political consequences for the legitimacy of the WTO dispute settlement system as a whole. Panel reports appealed by the losing party now remain without a final binding ruling, which undermines the winning party's right to enforce their rights under WTO law (Wolfe, 2020). This situation creates significant legal uncertainty and threatens WTO members' confidence in the rules-based multilateral trading system.

Developing countries face particular challenges in participating effectively in the WTO dispute settlement mechanism due to the significant effort required in terms of training and institutional reform (McDougall, 2018) . The imbalance of power between developed and developing countries creates injustice in the dispute settlement process, where decisions may reflect the interests of large countries and disregard the voices of smaller ones(Rubiyanto, 2019b). Developing countries may not have the same access to defend their interests as developed countries, which possess greater resources.

Tensions between the national interests of major powers and commitments under international law could trigger the fragmentation of global trade and pose serious challenges to multilateralism (Wolfe, 2020). This situation calls for reform of the WTO's dispute settlement system to address concerns regarding transparency, efficiency, the duration of disputes, and access for developing countries.

Consequently, an analysis of the WTO dispute settlement mechanism from the perspective of international economic law is of the utmost urgency in order to understand the system's compatibility with the principles of modern international economic law and to identify the implementation challenges that need to be addressed. This study aims to provide a comprehensive understanding of the effectiveness of the WTO dispute settlement mechanism, as well as alternative reforms that could strengthen the international trade law system in the face of ever-changing global economic dynamics.

Research Methodology

This study employs a qualitative literature review method using a juridical-normative approach. The data sources consist of primary legal materials in the form of international legislation, specifically the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU)

within the WTO framework, as well as secondary legal materials such as books, national and international journals, and other documents relating to the settlement of international trade disputes. A systematic and critical analysis was conducted of the relevant literature to identify the principles of international economic law, the WTO's dispute settlement mechanisms, as well as the challenges and necessary reforms. This approach enables the researcher to construct a comprehensive legal argument based on a synthesis of findings from various reliable sources of literature without conducting direct empirical data collection (Snyder, 2019); (Eliyah & Aslan, 2025) .

Results and Discussion

Trade Dispute Settlement Mechanisms within the WTO Framework

The mechanism for the settlement of trade disputes within the WTO framework is set out in *the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes* (DSU), which is the primary legal instrument for addressing disputes between WTO members. The DSU replaced the GATT dispute settlement system, which was more political in nature and non-compulsory, thereby providing a more rule-oriented and quasi-judicial foundation for the governance of the . The existence of the DSU demonstrates the WTO's commitment to enforcing international trade law through a structured and organised mechanism.

The Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) is a specialised body responsible for administering dispute settlement within the WTO framework and has jurisdiction over all disputes between WTO members arising from the WTO Agreements. The DSB is the sole body with the authority to establish Panels comprising independent experts to examine cases of dispute between member states(Solikhin, 2023). The DSB may accept or reject Panel rulings or decisions at the appellate level, and is authorised to monitor and oversee the implementation of the resulting rulings and recommendations.

The first stage in the WTO dispute settlement mechanism is consultation, which is mandatory and must be undertaken as an initial attempt to resolve the dispute diplomatically between the disputing parties. A request for consultation must be submitted in writing within 10 days, calculated from the first day the request is received by the relevant body, and a response to the request must be received within a maximum of 10 days(Sapanah, 2026). The consultation period lasts for a maximum of 60 days, and if the dispute is not resolved through consultation within that period, the complainant may submit a request to the DSB to establish a panel(Solikhin, 2023). If the consultation stage fails to reach an agreement, the next stage is the establishment of a panel, which is an ad hoc quasi-judicial body tasked with examining the factual and legal aspects of the dispute. The panel is established by the DSB at the request of one of the disputing parties, usually the complainant, and typically consists of three independent experts selected by the DSB. The panel assists the DSB in analysing, assessing and interpreting

the GATT-WTO Agreement on the , and is required to issue recommendations within six months; the DSB then has 60 days to adopt the report (Koul, 2018a) .

The panel's proceedings involve oral hearings—usually held on two occasions—based on written submissions from the parties, as well as the issuance of the descriptive part of the report to the disputing parties to allow for an interim review based on the draft report (Cling, 2014) . The panel must be able to make recommendations no later than six months after the Terms of Reference (ToR) are received, and within nine months of the panel's formation, the recommendations must be adopted by the DSB. The panel's review and adoption period is six months, with a maximum of nine months from the panel's formation until the final report is submitted to the parties(Solikhin, 2023) .

The panel's final report must be received by the parties within six months and must not exceed nine months from the establishment of the panel; the panel's final report is then circulated to all WTO members three weeks prior to its adoption by the DSB. The panel report must be received by the DSB within 60 days of its distribution to all WTO members, unless an appeal is lodged by one of the parties. If the DSB endorses the panel report within 60 days without any appeal, the total time taken to resolve the dispute without an appeal is approximately one year from the request for consultations (Koul, 2018a) .

If one of the disputing parties is dissatisfied with the panel's ruling, an appeal may be lodged with the Appellate Body, which is a permanent appellate body comprising seven international judges (Appellate Body, 2018). The Appellate Body was established in 1995 pursuant to Article 17 of the DSU and is based in Geneva, Switzerland, to review the legal aspects of panel reports. This body may uphold, modify or set aside a panel's ruling, and once the Appellate Body's report has been adopted by the DSB, its contents must be accepted by the disputing parties (Appellate Body, 2018).

The appeal review process through the Appellate Body must be completed within 90 days of the date the appeal is lodged, meaning that the total time taken to resolve the dispute through appeal is approximately 1 year and 3 months. The appeal report must be finalised within 60–90 days and the DSB must adopt the appeal report within 30 days, bringing the total duration of the appeal process to 1 year and 3 months (Koul, 2018b) . The Appellate Body may uphold, modify or reverse the legal findings and conclusions of a panel, and Appellate Body Reports, once adopted by the DSB, must be accepted by the parties to the dispute.

The Appellate Body comprises seven judges with a four-year term of office, which may be renewed, and three of the seven members shall sit on any one case to hear a specific appeal. Members of the Appellate Body shall serve on a rotational basis to ensure a fair distribution of cases and to prevent conflicts of interest amongst members of the Appellate Body. The Appellate Body hears appeals against reports

issued by panels in disputes brought by WTO members and has the authority to review the legal aspects of panel reports (Guzman, 2001).

The final stage in the WTO dispute settlement mechanism is the implementation of the rulings and recommendations issued by the DSB, whether through a panel report or an Appellate Body report. The implementation of rulings is the final and most crucial stage in the dispute settlement process, as it ensures that the respondent country fulfils its obligations under WTO law (Koul, 2018b). If the respondent country fails to comply with the ruling within the specified timeframe, the complainant may request the DSB to authorise retaliatory measures as a last resort.

Retaliation is a countermeasure in the field of trade between countries within the WTO framework, taken by a country as a result of a failure to reach an agreement in the dispute settlement process. In WTO practice, retaliation is very rarely carried out by member states, as only a few countries dare to take retaliatory measures as a last resort. Retaliation is used as a last resort when, during dispute settlement, the fulfilment of concessions cannot be achieved within the specified timeframe (Amsden, 2003).

The WTO dispute settlement system is designed to facilitate the resolution of international trade disputes in an efficient, transparent and fair manner through a series of steps ranging from consultations to the establishment of panels and the lodging of appeals. Decisions of the WTO Appellate Body are final and binding, and member states must comply with these rulings to ensure legal certainty in global trade. This mechanism involves five main stages: consultations, settlement through good offices/conciliation/mediation, the establishment of a panel, the appeals process, and the implementation of decisions (Sapanah, 2026).

The total time taken to resolve a dispute at the WTO comprises 60 days for consultations, 45 days for the establishment and appointment of a panel, 6 months for the panel's final report to the parties, 3 weeks for the final report to WTO members, 60 days for the adoption of the report, 60–90 days for the appeal report, and 30 days for the adoption of the appeal report. With a strict timeline and clear procedures, this system provides predictability for WTO members in formulating their trade policies and ensures the effective enforcement of international trade rules (Cling, 2014).

An Analysis of International Economic Law on the Implementation and Challenges of WTO Dispute Settlement

The WTO dispute settlement mechanism must be analysed within the framework of international economic law, which prioritises the principles of legal certainty, clarity of rules, and the enforcement of trade commitments between states. From the perspective of international economic law, the WTO's DSU system is designed to provide legal certainty in global trade through a rule-based and quasi-judicial mechanism (Rubiyanto, 2019b). However, analysis shows that the compatibility of the WTO mechanism with the principle of ' ' in modern international economic law faces

serious challenges regarding the effectiveness of the implementation of rulings and the compliance of member states under WTO law.

One of the main challenges facing the WTO dispute settlement system is the Appellate Body crisis that has persisted since December 2019, when the United States rejected the appointment of new members(Manalu & Anastasya Sembiring, 2025) . The US has repeatedly blocked new appointments to the Appellate Body due to concerns regarding judicial overreach and the Appellate Body's overly broad interpretation of WTO provisions. The consequence of this paralysis is that panel reports appealed by the losing party remain without a final binding ruling, which undermines the winning party's right to enforce their rights under WTO law (Wolfe, 2020) .

National interest politics presents a second significant challenge to the implementation of WTO rulings, as major countries tend to disregard rulings if they are not in their national interest. Compliance with WTO rulings depends heavily on the political commitment of member states, rather than on the coercive power of enforcement mechanisms. The limitations of the DSB, which lacks coercive power, exacerbate this situation, meaning that the implementation of rulings is not always effective, particularly against countries with dominant economic power(Anindia & Lie, 2026) .

Developing countries face particular challenges in participating effectively in the WTO dispute settlement mechanism due to the significant effort required in terms of training and institutional reform (Amsden, 2003) . The imbalance of power between developed and developing countries creates injustice in the dispute settlement process, where decisions may reflect the interests of large countries and disregard the voices of smaller ones(Rubiyanto, 2019b) . Developing countries may not have the same access to defend their interests as developed countries, which possess greater resources in the form of legal expertise and financial capacity.

Although Indonesia won the dispute at both the Panel and Appellate Body levels in case DS 592, the implementation of the ruling faced serious obstacles due to US non-compliance, which led to a bilateral settlement via a Memorandum of Understanding in 2014. This situation highlights the structural weaknesses of the compliance mechanism within the WTO's DSU system, where, even though a developing country may succeed in winning a dispute legally, limited retaliatory capacity renders enforcement ineffective(Anindia & Lie, 2026) .

Challenges in the implementation of the DSB also include the issue of remand, which has previously been encountered in one of the dispute settlement procedures through the Appellate Body, namely the issue of returning the ruling file to the panel. The scope of dispute settlement is extremely broad and requires panel members and Appellate Body members to possess extensive knowledge and experience in handling international trade disputes, particularly for developing countries. The threat to the

credibility of the DSU itself—as indicated by whether panels or the Appellate Body deliver satisfactory rulings—is also a concern (Putri, 2026).

Disputes relating to cross-border digital trade highlight the need to update dispute settlement mechanisms so that they are better adapted to developments in technology and the global digital economy. The emergence of issues surrounding digital trade and the digital economy calls for reform of the WTO dispute settlement system to ensure it remains relevant and responsive to contemporary challenges (Manalu & Anastasya Sembiring, 2025). These findings underscore the importance of institutional reform within the WTO dispute settlement system to address the ever-changing dynamics of the global economy.

Criticism of the WTO dispute settlement system also covers issues relating to the transparency and efficiency of the mechanism, in particular the length of dispute settlement proceedings, access for developing countries, and the implementation of decisions. The EU has been pushing for reforms that address concerns regarding the efficiency of procedures, excessively long dispute durations, and better access for developing countries to participate. The Doha Round negotiations, launched in 2001, aimed to reach an agreement on improvements to the Dispute Settlement Understanding, but ultimately stalled (Guo & Kong, 2024).

Reform of the WTO dispute settlement system is a priority, as stated by the WTO Director-General in February 2023, who noted that reform of the organisation's dispute settlement system is a priority (Fiorini et al., 2021). The proposed reforms include new rules to limit industrial subsidies in order to promote fair competition, initiatives in the field of digital trade, and investment facilitation. The German Ministry of Economics emphasised that the German government, together with the European Commission, is actively pursuing reforms within the WTO (Wolff, 2022).

The European Union plays a central role in shaping the reform of the WTO's dispute settlement mechanism, particularly in light of the crisis in the Appellate Body that has been ongoing since 2019. The European Union's approach to WTO dispute settlement reform reflects broader objectives, namely to strengthen global trade governance, promote international cooperation, and ensure that the WTO remains a key pillar of the global trading system. The European Union's proposals emphasise the importance of maintaining a binding two-tier dispute settlement system and call for the mechanism to be made more efficient (Hoekman & Mavroidis, 2020).

The European Union has actively promoted interim mechanisms and played a leading role in the negotiations on the Multi-Party Interim Appeal Arbitration Arrangement (MPIA) to temporarily address the paralysis of the Appellate Body. The MPIA provides an alternative dispute settlement mechanism that operates without US involvement and ensures that parties can continue to use the WTO's two-tier dispute settlement mechanism (Fiorini et al., 2021). The MPIA is becoming increasingly

important as a temporary solution to maintain a fully functioning dispute settlement system amongst willing Members (Wolff, 2022).

An analysis of international economic law regarding WTO mechanisms has also identified the need to optimise the functioning of the Appellate Body and to adapt the ' ' to global economic developments. Recommendations include increasing representation for developing countries within the WTO's institutional structure and dispute settlement mechanisms. The WTO's dispute settlement system needs to address special and differential treatment, which remains unfair and has a significant impact on the development progress of developing countries (Amsden, 2003).

Thus, the research findings indicate that whilst the DSB plays a vital role in maintaining the stability of the multilateral trading system, its effectiveness is under pressure due to the crisis within the Appellate Body, which has led to delays in the dispute settlement process. These findings underscore the importance of institutional reform within the WTO's dispute settlement system to ensure it remains relevant and responsive to contemporary challenges. Priority reforms should address the appellate review process, procedural speed, compliance rights, and capacity-building for middle-income Members and prospective Members.

Conclusion

The mechanism for resolving trade disputes within the WTO framework, as set out in the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU), represents a significant innovation in rules-based multilateral trade governance. This system provides legal certainty through a compulsory quasi-judicial mechanism, comprising stages of consultation, the establishment of expert panels, appeals to the Appellate Body, and the implementation of binding rulings. The uniqueness of the WTO system lies in its rule-oriented nature and the guarantee that panel and Appellate Body reports must be accepted by the disputing parties following their adoption by the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB), thereby providing predictability for WTO members in formulating their trade policies.

However, an analysis of international economic law regarding the implementation of WTO mechanisms reveals serious challenges that threaten the legitimacy of the global dispute settlement system. The crisis in the Appellate Body since December 2019, resulting from the United States' refusal to appoint new members, has created a legal vacuum that prevents the winning party from enforcing their rights under WTO law. The imbalance of power between developed and developing countries in the dispute settlement process, the difficulties in enforcing rulings against countries with dominant economic power, and the limited capacity of developing countries to retaliate reveal the structural weaknesses of the compliance mechanism within the WTO's DSU system.

Reform of the WTO dispute settlement system is a priority for addressing issues relating to transparency, efficiency, the length of disputes, and access for developing

countries. The Multilateral Provisional Appeal Arrangement (MPIA) promoted by the European Union provides an alternative dispute settlement mechanism that operates without US involvement and ensures that parties can continue to use the WTO's two-stage dispute settlement mechanism. Reforms that prioritise appellate review, procedural speed, compliance rights, and capacity-building for middle-income Members and prospective Members will strengthen the international trade legal system in the face of ever-changing global economic dynamics and ensure that the WTO remains a cornerstone of the global trading system.

References

- Amsden, A. H. (2003). *Chapter 5: Industrialization under new WTO law*. <https://www.elgaronline.com/edcollchap/9781843760443.00009.xml>
- Anindia, L., & Lie, G. (2026). Tinjauan Yuridis Normatif Sengketa Perdagangan Internasional Atas Kebijakan Amerika Serikat yang Membatasi Rokok Kretek Indonesia. *Lex Sharia Pacta Sunt Servanda: Jurnal Hukum Islam Dan Kebijakan*, 3(2), 8–16.
- Busch, M., & Reinhardt, E. (2000). Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: Early Settlement in GATT/WTO Disputes. *Fordham International Law Journal*, 24(1), 158.
- Cling, J.-P. (2014). The future of global trade and the WTO. *Foresight*, 16(2), 109–125. <https://doi.org/10.1108/FS-06-2012-0044>
- Eliyah, E., & Aslan, A. (2025). STAKE'S EVALUATION MODEL: METODE PENELITIAN. *Prosiding Seminar Nasional Indonesia*, 3(2), Article 2.
- Fiorini, M., Hoekman, B., Mavroidis, P. C., Nelson, D., & Wolfe, R. (2021). Stakeholder Preferences and Priorities for the Next WTO Director General. *Global Policy*, 12(S3), 13–22. <https://doi.org/10.1111/1758-5899.12926>
- Guo, S., & Kong, Q. (2024). *A Holistic Approach for WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism Reforms: US Demands and the Restoration of the Appellate Body* (SSRN Scholarly Paper No. 4970257). Social Science Research Network. <https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=4970257>
- Guzman, A. T. (2001). *Global Governance and the WTO*. <https://escholarship.org/uc/item/9fd5p4sb>
- Hoekman, B. M., & Mavroidis, P. C. (2020). To AB or Not to AB? Dispute Settlement in WTO Reform. *Journal of International Economic Law*, 23(3), 1–20. <https://doi.org/10.1093/jiel/jgaa020>
- Koul, A. K. (2018a). World Trade Organisation: Its Birth and Background. In A. K. Koul (Ed.), *Guide to the WTO and GATT: Economics, Law and Politics* (pp. 1–37). Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-2089-7_1
- Koul, A. K. (2018b). World Trade Organisation (WTO): The Structural Dimensions. In A. K. Koul (Ed.), *Guide to the WTO and GATT: Economics, Law and Politics* (pp. 39–53). Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-2089-7_2
- Manalu, A. E., & Anastasya Sembiring, D. M. (2025). PERAN WTO DALAM PENYELESAIAN SENKETA PERDAGANGAN INTERNASIONAL. *HUMANITIS: Jurnal Homaniora, Sosial Dan Bisnis*, 2(8), 1695–1701.

- McDougall, R. (2018). *Crisis in the WTO Restoring the WTO Dispute Settlement Function*. (194).
- Ortino, F., & Petersmann, E.-U. (2004). *The WTO Dispute Settlement System, 1995-2003*. Kluwer Law International B.V.
- Putri, C. A. (2026). Analisis Prinsip-Prinsip dan Mekanisme Penyelesaian Sengketa WTO dalam Memastikan Keadilan Sistem Perdagangan Internasional Modern. *Media Hukum Indonesia (MHI)*, 4(1), 292–301. <https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.17861565>
- Rubiyanto, R. (2019a). PERAN WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION (WTO) DALAM MENYELESAIKAN SENGKETA PERDAGANGAN INTERNASIONAL. *JURNAL ILMIAH HUKUM DAN DINAMIKA MASYARAKAT*, 17(1). <https://doi.org/10.56444/hdm.v17i1.1274>
- Rubiyanto, R. (2019b). PERAN WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION (WTO) DALAM MENYELESAIKAN SENGKETA PERDAGANGAN INTERNASIONAL. *JURNAL ILMIAH HUKUM DAN DINAMIKA MASYARAKAT*, 17(1). <https://doi.org/10.56444/hdm.v17i1.1274>
- Sapanah, M. (2026). Peran World Trade Organization WTO Dalam Penyelesaian Sengketa Perdagangan Internasional. *Media Hukum Indonesia (MHI)*, 4(1), 130–137. <https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.17844160>
- Snyder, H. (2019). Literature review as a research methodology: An overview and guidelines. *Journal of Business Research*, 104, 333–339. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbusres.2019.07.039>
- Solikhin, R. (2023). Sistem Penyelesaian Sengketa Dagang Internasional dalam Kerangka WTO: Mekanisme, Efektivitas Pelaksanaan Putusan dan Tindakan Retaliasi sebagai Upaya Pemulihan Hak. *Padjadjaran Law Review*, 11(1), 114–127. <https://doi.org/10.56895/plr.v11i1.1237>
- Wagner, M. (2020). The Impending Demise of the WTO Appellate Body: From Centrepiece to Historical Relic? In C. Lo, J. Nakagawa, & T. Chen (Eds.), *The Appellate Body of the WTO and Its Reform* (pp. 67–90). Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-0255-2_5
- Wolfe, R. (2020). Reforming WTO Conflict Management: Why and How to Improve the Use of ‘Specific Trade Concerns.’ *Journal of International Economic Law*, 23(4), 817–839. <https://doi.org/10.1093/jiel/jgaa034>
- Wolff, A. W. (2022). *WTO 2025: Restoring Binding Dispute Settlement* (SSRN Scholarly Paper No. 4078201). Social Science Research Network. <https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4078201>
- Badan Banding. (2018). *Badan Banding di Organisasi Perdagangan Dunia (WTO)*. Wikipedia Bahasa Indonesia.